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SUMMARY

Children in the history of psychology

We know that childhood is a concept constructed and dependent on the historical and cultural context (Aries, 1960/1973). Although the work of Philippe Aries indicated that childhood, as a stage differentiated from adulthood, can be located in the Renaissance, this statement is the subject of debate, because it underlies a unique vision of childhood.

Against this idea, historians point out that in no historical epoch have children or childhood been seen in a unique way, in other words, diversity within cultures, societies and individuals is what characterizes this moment of life.

The concept of childhood is particularly sensitive to historical and cultural reality and, moreover, cuts across several disciplines (sociology, history, anthropology, economics, demography and, of course, psychology). The beginning of the 20th century is the moment in which concern for children and childhood acquires a total and unprecedented relevance in society, whether European or American (Puche-Navarro, in press).

According to Jaan Valsiner (1997), the science of development and its view of children and their development is interdependent with the society in which it is immersed. From the historical-cultural approach of developmental psychology, Valsiner poses a question that is still very valid: how should we understand development? Valsiner's conceptual and epistemological legacy provides the elements to elaborate this question "we will better understand the child and his development if we make use of the narrative forms that developmental science requires to describe itself".

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Dear colleague,

It is a pleasure to send you this issue of the Division 18 Newsletter (History of Applied Psychology) which is dedicated to the history of child psychology. It is a branch of psychology that studies child development in general. Currently, it has become a useful instrument for our society that addresses the study of psychological and neuro-developmental issues in children and adolescents. Contributions to child psychology come from various authors, from different periods of history, and from diverse approaches. Through history, works of philosophers and educators such as Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Erasmus, and Vives showed great interests on development and on well-being of the children.

We can also mention the contributions of scientists, physicians and naturalists in child psychology who tried to find answers about the origin of the human species, the differences between people, the origin of language, the nature of human health, etc. Jean Héroard (1551-1628), Charles Darwin (1809- 1882), and Francis Galton (1822 - 1911) are well-known names for their research on health and human development. The book "The soul of the child" (1882) by William Thierry Preyer (1841 – 1897) marked the beginning of a decisive stage for the constitution of child psychology as an independent discipline. As a pioneer, he contributed to the implementation of research of human development based on empirical observation and experimentation.

Contributions of different pioneers allow to build up solid scientific knowledge in the field of child psychology. Some of the outstanding names are such as Cheselden (1728), Tiedeman (1787), Kussmaul (1859), Feldmann (1833), Sismund (1856), Kussmaul (1859), Baldwin (1895), Ament (1899), Stern (1900), Dessoir (1902), Baldwin (1901), Piaget (1926), Binet (1907), Freud (1910), Montessori (1936), Decroly (1978), Meumann (1908), Vygotsky ((1934), Fritzsch (1910), Claparède (1905), Giese (1915), Barnés (1917), Götz (1918), Bradbury (1937), Dennis, 1949), McLean (1954), Anderson (1956), Kessen (1965), Zazzo (1970), Senn (1975), Hearst (1979; Ornstein (1979), Carmichael (1983), etc.

Thanks to their works and the contributions of other scientists, child psychology has become an interesting field of psychology as an academic discipline and as a profession. As an academic discipline, child psychology aims to understand and to explain the behaviors, physical and motor characteristics, and mental processes (cognition, emotion, attention, perception, emotional intelligence, etc.) of children to help them in their growth and development periods. As a profession, child psychology offers a range of opportunities such as to carry out psychological evaluation of children's problems, to implement of family therapy, to work in educational guidance, to promote mental health and psychological well-being of children and adolescents.

This Newsletter presents some relevant contributions on this issue. Professor Victoria del Barrio analyses the works of Charlotte Bühler, rememorating her contribution to developmental testing. Professor Ramiro Tau and Professor Luciana Mariñelarena-Dondena expose child and human development issue; they explain the main challenge faced which consists of reaching a unified model of human development to avoid the different reductionisms into which disciplinary models lead to. Professor Rebeca Puche-Navarro underlines the Wonder Years in the history of Developmental Psychology (The 1970s) which was an important period in terms of contributions to the field of child psychology.

Professor Jaan Valsiner stresses on the History of psychology as the garden of delicious ideas for innovation. He invites to re-discover the real history of psychology.

We profit this opportunity to invite all of you to look for and then send us information and news related to those historical sites at which psychology was created thanks to the efforts of our masters and giants. You might also suggest new topics for the coming issues. Our newsletter tries to be our common work, and an important piece for our common memory.

Very cordially,

Richard Mababu Ph. D
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Rememoration of the work on developmental testing by Charlotte Bühler

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When the works of Charlotte Bühler are reread, her calm, thoroughness, and dedication to the study of child evolution are astonishing. That feeling always haunts the writings of early twentieth-century child scholars. It is as if the "tempo" of the investigation would have changed diametrically. Her works, made without any technology other than careful observation, are a model of precision and good work.

Vienna, 1893-1974

Her maiden's name was Charlotte Malachowski. She studied natural sciences and humanities at the University of Freiburg and the University of Berlin, graduating in 1913. In 1918, she received her doctorate from the University of Munich. Then she went to Dresden to work with Karl Bühler with whom he married in 1916. The following year she had her first daughter. She changed her name to Bülher.

The couple went on to direct the famous Psychology Institute in Vienna, where she continued her research in the fields of child and youth psychology, as well as working on her habilitation. In 1918 she published her first paper about children's imagination and completed her studies in 1920 at the Technical University of Dresden, becoming qualified to teach in Saxony. In 1929, she was nominated professor at the University of Vienna.

With the emerging of the Nazi political movement the couple felt threatened, since Charlotte was Jewish-. They fled to Oslo, from where they both emigrated to the USA in 1939. Charlotte was then 46 years old and Karl Bühler, her husband, already had 60.

Karl did not adapt good to America. Charlotte, on the other hand, much younger, flourished and consolidated as an expert in child development evaluation, creating a school with a group of collaborators who enabled her wide work.

She developed her work, begun in Germany in 1922, and practically published a book annually, which made her a thriving researcher. Among other things, she created some intelligence development tests that are still used nowadays. In 1942, she obtained a Senior position at the Minneapolis General Hospital. In 1945 she became an American citizen, and moved to Los Angeles, California, as chief psychologist at the Los Angeles County Hospital. She held this position until her retirement in 1958. During that time, she also served as a professor of Psychiatry at the University of Southern California. She is also considered as a pioneer in the field of gerontology, as well as in humanistic psychology, together with Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow.

After her retirement she went into private practice in Beverly Hills, California. In her later years, weakened by illness, she wrote her autobiography. In 1971 she moved

back to Berlin with her son (o she visited Berlin). She was honored by the German Government before she died, at age 80 in 1974. After that, she and her husband were greatly acknowledged in Berlin. In Vienna, the "Charlotte Bühler Institute for practical research on infants" was stablished in 1992. Her work consists of about 168 works, fundamentally focused on the development of the child, of old age and humanistic psychology.

Her first work, Das Märchen und Die Phantasie des Kindes ("The Fairy Tale and the Imagination of the Child"). Barth, Leipzig 1918, was followed by many others published in different places in Germany. Let us also mention here her Kleinkindertests: Entwicklungs-tests vom 1. bis 6. Lebensjahr ("Infant testing: Developmental testing from 1 up to 6 years of age"). Barth,Leipzig, 1932, also reprinted even after having emigrated to the USA, (Munich 1952). and Psychologie Im Leben Userer Zeit ("Psychology in the Life of Our Times") Droemer/Knaur, Munich, Zurich 1962.

Then she published: "An attempt at analysis and theory of mental puberty ". G. Fischer, Jena 1922. After that Kindheit und Jugend: Genese des Bewußtseins (" Childhood and Adolescence: Origins of Consciousness "). Hirzel, Leipzig 1928., and Das Seelenleben des Jugendlichen ("The mental life of Young People"), where adolescent development is examined. In 1933, her work on Der menschliche Lebenslauf als psychologisches Problem ("The course of human life as a psychological problem") was the first German-language study to include old age among the psychological age-span and to consider gerontopsychology a part of psychology, where the study of human development closes, after reaching old age.

For that reason, she was considered as the German pioneer on that issue. In 1937 she published Kind und Familie: Untersuchungen der Wechselbeziehungen des Kindes mit seiner Familie ("Child and family: Studies on the interactions of the child with his family"), and in 1938, Praktische Kinderpsychologie ("Practical child psychology"). These were years of a frantic production.

The work that is analyzed here belongs to this era prior to emigration and collects her research on the evaluation of intelligence. It is contained in a book written in collaboration with Hildegard Hetzer: Kleinkindertests: Entwicklungs-tests ("Test for early childhood. Development tests for the first to sixth years of life"). The Spanish translation (Labor, Barcelona, 1933), appeared a year after the original German edition. This work shows that her personal research was already totally underway and with important results before emigrating to USA. Therefore, this author may be considered a European psychologist. The English (1935) and French editions (1933) are one more proof of the wide dissemination of ideas throughout Europe well before the beginning of the II World War.

The investigation contained in Kleinkindertests: Entwicklungs-tests had begun two years before with the support of the City of Vienna, -which provided access to the children evaluated-, and also from the Rockefeller Foundation, that became "sponsor" of the work. This support allowed the hiring of numerous collaborators who did a huge job in relatively little time. The first results on the topic for three years old were published in 1928-1930, and in 1933 the age ranges of 4-6 years were added. The complete results are here considered and presented.

CHARLOTTE BUHLER (1893-1974)

The roots of C. Bülher's work may be found in the work of J.J. Rousseau, who in the 18th century, with his work Emile, raised the question of the child and the characteristics of childhood. Pestalozzi, Timdemann, and Froebel began the observe the child's life, but it was in the nineteenth century when the fever of children's study unleashed. First there were the observations of loving and illustrated parents such as Darwin, Taine,

Binet, Machado Alvarez, who paved the way to their followers. However, the first experimental approach was due to G. Stanley Hall, who greatly influenced some disciples such as H.H. Goodard, A. Gessell, and L. Terman.

The topic of child development also benefited from the work of J.B. Watson (1878-1958) who, taking advantage of Pavlov's studies, provided with the vision of behaviorism, that completed the previous knowledge adding to it a systematic and experimental evaluation of the child. In 1920, his "Conditioned Emotional Reactions" appeared, about reflexes and emotions; then, in 1928 Gessell offered his work on Infancy and Human Growth, and at the same time it also appeared the Minnesota Preschool Test of Goodenough et al., in 1932, soon followed by the work of H. Wallon, on the Child's thought, appeared in 1945.

In fact, the first formal evaluation of intelligence was due to Binet's work (1903) that paved the way to other researchers, who came after him and added new details. In the case of C. Bühler, her contribution consisted of dealing with the issue of development, since she chose to study the early days of child's life, where intelligence could not be evaluated but only the physical development. As it is well known, Binet test begins at 3 years old, and focuses on the later development of intelligence, while C. Bühler begins at age 0 and its goal is the study of the general development instead of the performance, as was the case of Binet test. This later one was adapted to the American population and appeared in an English version in 1910.

The Charlotte Bühler scale focuses on evaluating: 1) body control and coordination; 2) - Mental capacity; 3- Manipulation of objects, memory and attention; 4) - social development. She obtained, together with her collaborators, evidence that later they used in her investigations. The evaluation of the first stage of life (0-1 years), was made in collaboration with L. Frank and K. Wolf and was prepared to monthly evaluate each only 10 items. The scales for the second year of life were worked by I. Gindl and L. Koller; the test has 10 items per quarter. Tests for the 3-5 years were made by M. Maudry and have 10 items per year. Test for the sixth year of life is the work of L. Danziger who again uses 10 items for this evaluation. The generosity of the director of the investigation allowed all the collaborators to sign the authorship of each of the scales they contributed to create as a team.

Kleinkindertests: Entwicklungs-testsexplains and photographs all the material to be used. The form of its application, the execution times, as well as the evaluation of the different age sections are described in detail. It gives much importance to the child's habituation to the test situation. The author even proposes that children under three might be evaluated in their domestic environment and not in an office, in order to facilitate the appropriate habituation.

Table 1. Binet & Bühler scales compared.

BINET	BÜHLER*
3 years	
1. Indicate nose, eyes and mouth	1. Fasten
2. Repeat two figures	2. Understand the social concept of play
3. Count objects	3. Resume an interrupted task
4. Talk about absent things	4. Pronounced your last name
5. Meeting two things of three hidden	5. Repeat a sentence of six syllables
	6. Repeat four syllables
	7. Build by imitation
	8. Make a construction
	9. Something using a chair
	10. Enter four figures
BINET	BÜHLER
4 years	
1. Name your sex	1. Treat a container full of water
2. Name: key, knife and cent	2. Moral interpretation of drawings
3. Repeat three figures	3. Classify by cards
4. Compare two lines	4. verbal behavior formulation
	5. Find 3 things of 4 hidden
	6. Repeat verses of 8 syllables or 3 figure numbers
	7. Copy a circumference
	8. Call a construction
	9. Take out a hook ring
	10. Interprets scenes

* It Starts in the first month of life

Each item of the tests has a certain value measured in days, which are added, in case of a positive answer, or subtracted, if the answer is failed. To obtain a mental age, the ratio between the sum of the days of the real age and the number of days obtained in the test results are calculated, as it is usually done in this type of tests.

If we compare her scales with those of Binet (before the review carried out by Terman- Merrill in the Stanford edition), we can get an idea both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of her contribution (see Table 1). With this small sample of items, the differences between both tests are clear.

The Binet scale focuses on the school life of children, which is after all, the main purpose that had guided the construction of that scale. Bühler's test, on the other side, covers more global and social dimensions of childhood. It could be argued that the Binet scale aimed at the selection of students at school, while Bühler's was built for knowing and assessing people.

Carlotta Bühler's work was huge and thorough both in Germany and in the USA, but the colleague's recognition did not do justice to her. Let's briefly consider a quick view on the evolution of quotations to her works, since her early days to the present. It turns out that in her beginnings, quotations to her were very scarce (two or three per year); around 1981, a decade after her death, there is an increase in citations (an average of 20 per year), clearly related to a new interest on humanistic psychology as well as on Gerontology and life cycle psychology. Her significant achievements when dealing on child development have passed quite neglected, and in our opinion, they continue to be worth attention and consideration. Psychological processes studied by her on the early stages of child life have not changed since then, and her studies continue to be as valuable as they were when they were obtained.

On such a ground, I wanted here to remember her name and her work as relevant when we are almost a century away from her investigations in the field of developmental psychology.

Child and Human Development in perspective

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The history of the notion of development shows strong divergences and transfers of knowledge between multiple fields of studies. In one way or another, it is difficult to find any discipline, whether scientific, philosophical or artistic, that has not dealt with the problem of development. But the first question that arises is about the entity: development of what?

In very broad terms, 'development' usually refers to the progressive series of changes in a behaviour, a function or a structure over a period of time of existence of a person, an organism or a society. When the notion of development refers explicitly to the 'child' or the 'human', it can suggest changes in phenomena as diverse as those concerning the biological body, the mind or the political and economic macro-processes that take place in large societies. While the notion of 'human development' is most often used as a syncretic category, bringing together in a holistic way all these biological, psychological or social dimensions, 'child development' is presented as an equivalent notion, but restricted to a specific period of human life.

The non-existence of a conceptual field in which this notion is inscribed with full legitimacy, is another aspect of the dispersion of its uses. In fact, it is a transversal concept, and no single discipline can claim complete jurisdiction over it. In any case, it is inevitable to recognise in it a number of ideas with which it overlaps or is confused: change, evolution, growth, transformation, increase of certain magnitudes or the passage from a potential and latent state to a current and expressed one.

THE PROBLEM OF TIME IN CHILD AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Any theory concerning development, whether explicitly stated in its research agenda or not, presupposes a particular conception of time (Lenzi, Borzi & Tau, 2010). Nevertheless, not every theory that considers a temporal dimension implies a theory of development. In fact, not just any change or modification across time is development. In other terms, a diachronic perspective of a phenomenon is not sufficient to inscribe a theory in the field of development. On the contrary, if we assume that in any kind of development there is always a dialectical relation between variation and transformation, the decisive aspect is the emergence of novelties, starting from previous states, systems or structures that do not contain them (Overton & Müller, 2003; Valsiner, 1998; 2006).

Conceptions of time are often expressed in the visual form of lines, arrows, trees, surfaces, which account for trajectories, divergences, turning points, loops, inversions, etc. (Yamada & Kato, 2006). All of these spatial representations are often linear or unidimensional (Rudolph, 2006), and they have implications for the modelling of theory—or they just expose the underlying assumptions of the researchers. Although mathematicians have developed complex structures that could be used to represent complexities of developmental time, social and human sciences have either ignored these discoveries or simply fallen back repeatedly on some version of physics' 'clock time' (Rudolph, 2006).

La persistencia de la memoria (Salvador Dali, 1931).

Indeed, even if 'irreversibility of time' is accepted as an axiom in theories on human development, this claim may be insufficient or inaccurate, depending on the system and scale under consideration. Psychoanalysis, for example, has shown that, with regard to the effectiveness of certain representations for the production of symptoms, timelessness must be admitted for the psychic unconscious system. Something comparable happens with retroaction, afterwardsness or après-coup (Arlow, 1986).

With other objectives, Piagetian genetic psychology showed that memory is reconstructive, and progress in the child's cognitive organisation affects the mnemic traces, transforming memories from the same factual event, but evoked at different moments (Inhelder, 1970). One of the many consequences of this observation is that the evocation of a memory is never a return to a fixed and stable point or mark. In any of these cases, the representation of time as a line, or even with loops and inflections, is limited and poor in relation to the complexity of the temporal processes involved in these changes.

DEVELOPMENT CHANGE

To understand the conceptual variability of child and human development, it is necessary to examine the general notion of development. Although it is usually adjectivised, its generic use designates changes in a behaviour, function or structure, something that occurs in a person, a living organism or in human institutions—culture, economy, family, normative systems, etc. In almost all uses, it is an idea often confused with the notion of evolution, with continuist connotations (Doron & Parot, 1993; VandenBos, 2007).

In other words, development is assumed to be the passage from one moment, stage, phase or level to another quantitatively or qualitatively different, that keeps some link with the previous one. In this transition, the subsequent moment is usually recognised as more stable or complex than the previous ones, being those that preceded it a necessary condition.

Occasionally, development is associated with some variety of finalism or teleology: changes have a direction or even a purpose (Monod, 19070; Rosenblueth, Wiener & Bigelow, 1943). This idea about the direction of changes, although criticised in biology and other sciences (Wagner-Egger, Delouvée, Gauvrit & Dieguez, 2018), today takes on a new meaning for cybernetics and artificial intelligence, domains in which artificial systems evolve and self-generate according to a set of general goals defined from their initial construction (Contreras-Koterbay, 2019; Kamath & Liu, 2021).

On the contrary, there are conceptions on development that do not appeal to a form finalism, but to a certain efficiency, as in Darwin's theory of evolution (1959), in which changes in the structure and function of biological organisms are random, being adaptation to the environment the basis of selection, orientation and fixation of transformations. Following these theses, contrary to any preformism that considers the final stages as the manifestation of what was already latently anticipated (Van Gertz, 2003), studies on phylogenesis greatly expanded theorisations on development (Futuyma, 2017).

Detailed exploration of the coordination between genetic mutations and the adaptation that results from the somatic expression of these genes consolidated the study of the dynamics between organism and context. Thus, while recognising the zygote as the key point in the development of a biological organism, changes that will occur in its development are unpredictable at some scales and predictable at larger ones—for example, we know with certainty that it will die, and from there, it is possible to predict other events with a different degree of possibility. This difficulty in predicting at all levels is not due to a lack of information—operational chance, in Monod's (1970) terms—but to the essential chance that regulates the processes of open and complex systems (Chapman, 1988; Garcia, 2006; Overton, 2006).

The initial genetic conditions do not determine the subsequent course of development, but just the great field of possible orientations. Without strong prediction, the path of transformations that actually occur can be reconstructed only retroactively and explained as the result of the complex and incessant interactions between the organism's dispositions and the conditions of the environment (Waddington, 1957; Valsiner & Connolly, 2003).

Following Overton (2003), it is possible to recognise some basic conceptions of change in different theories on development. On the one hand, 'transformational' change is the one that gives rise to the emergence of novelties. It is a change that produces something qualitatively new, which was not announced in the previous forms or organisations and, consequently, implies a discontinuity. This transformational change leads to increasingly complex forms and involves a dialectical relationship between continuities and

discontinuities (Overton & Reese, 1981), since it is not a creation ex nihilo, but neither is it reducible to the preceding organisations. 'Variational' change, on the other hand, is a modification of a predominantly continuous and quantitative nature. Strictly speaking, it refers to a change in the degree or scope of a function or capacity—as in the acquisition of a new lexicon or the inclusion of new beneficiaries in a legal system that remains essentially unchanged.

At least three metatheoretical solutions can be identified from these two types of change: it is possible to emphasise one, the other, or to assume the complementary participation of both. In the first case, development can be conceived essentially as the result of a variational change. Thus, qualitative changes are the phenomenic appearance of the cumulative variations. This solution disregards transformations and reduces them to linear and additive processes. The second solution, on the contrary, characterises development as an essentially transformational process of qualitatively different steps, in which variations are irrelevant. Finally, in a relational model, variation and transformation can be a necessary part of a theory of development, since it is assumed that variations can result in transformations, and transformations can lead to variations (Overton, 2003).

Any of these three perspectives on development has methodological and theoretical consequences (Valsiner, 2006). The strategies for data production and analysis in order to study development will necessarily be different if one of these changes is considered predominant or if they are recognised as coexisting. In terms of theoretical implications, the variational approach presupposes linear changes, in which unpredictability is lower. It was precisely this summative approach of American behaviourism that led Watson (1958) to make one of the most famous and enthusiastic claims in the history of psychology: that through training and conditioning it is possible to shape the future of a healthy child, making him, for example, an artist, a doctor or a criminal.

Transformational perspectives on development, on the other hand, often fail to explain the occurrence of changes. If change results in ruptures or in radically different moments, it is difficult to see any kind of common denominator in such a series, which puts into question the very idea of development as a process. Unless an invariable sequence is admitted—which, in turn, renders useless any effort to modify a future confused with destiny—in such a model, transformations can neither be provoked nor predicted. However, the broad spectrum of relational approaches, in which transformation and variation are dialectically coordinated, expands the field of the possible futures (Piaget, 1983), opening up a potential zone that is not reached in a chaotic manner, but also does not follow a pre-designed path. From this standpoint, development can follow completely different directions and still show a progression in which the coexistence of continuities and discontinuities can be recognised (Chapman, 1988).

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIO-MATERIAL CONDITIONS

While much of the literature on development is concerned with the growth of the living organism, as well as with affective or cognitive changes in a period of time—child or human development in their biological and psychological versions—, other traditions have been interested in the socio-material factors of development. Since the 1990s, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been promoting a specific paradigm for studying, promoting and measuring 'human development'. According to this international organisation, human development is "the process of enlarging people's choices by expanding human functioning's and capabilities" (UNDP, 2000, p. 17).

In this framework, the focus is explicitly on 'humans' and the creation of life opportunities, although, comparatively speaking, contextual aspects are much more relevant than in other research traditions. In fact, the Human Development Index (HDI), a statistical indicator derived from this paradigm, "measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development-a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living" (p. 17). Through this index, countries—not individuals or regional populations—are ranked on the basis of life expectancy, access to education and per capita income-associated with no further consideration of the notion of 'quality of life'.

The HDI is an instrument that aims to identify the field of present and future opportunities for human development. That is, to define objectively whether people are in a position 'to be' and 'to do' in the course of their lives. From this angle, human development is conceived as a field of possibilities that is amplified when certain socio-economic conditions are achieved, being the freedom of individuals one of the fundamental pillars.

CONVERGENCE FRAMEWORKS IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Since the 21st century, what is known as the 'convergence explanatory framework' or 'developmental science' (Lewis, 2000) has become more firmly established, a perspective that, based on complex systems theory, aims to establish the general principles of human development, regardless of the type of phenomena considered (Lenzi, Borzi & Tau, 2010). This relational systemic approach (Lerner, Hershberg, Hilliard, & Johnson, 2015), built on a relational metatheory and on the dynamic relationship between individuals and contexts, configures a field informed by science, but also by philosophical, methodological and

epistemological reflection. The main challenge of a unified model of human development is to avoid the different reductionisms into which disciplinary models lead. This implies linking the level of an embodied agency with that of its different levels of contextual integration. This approach draws on different considerations of change as it is studied and explained in human studies, but also in natural disciplines, as well as in the models offered by the formal sciences.

Of all the aspects involved in a general theory of development based on complex systems, it is unavoidable to mention the critique to classical causal explanation (Castorina & Baquero, 2005; García, 1999), because of its inadequacy to produce consistent explanations of change over time. Classical causalism establishes injective relations between causes and effects —where for an event 'a' to be the cause of an event 'b', three conditions must be met: that 'a' happens before 'b', that whenever 'a' happens 'b' happens, and that 'a' and 'b' are proximal in time and space (Ferrater Mora, 1965). Current models of change, and especially the interactions between variation and transformation, cannot be captured if change is reduced to a succession of causes in the classical sense (Overton & Müller, 2003; Valsiner, 1998). Instead of exploring the underlying causes of observable changes in human development, a convergent perspective will attempt to explain the emergence of novelty through self-organisation, as well as the exploration of the orientations, attractions, disturbances, transformations, interactions and reorganisations of a complex system.

In sum, the notion of development has been historically related with other related ideas about time and change. Beyond the cross-influences and the impact of the theory of the evolution of species, each discipline promoted a particular angle. Nowadays, conceptual frameworks of convergence in human development focus on the notion of change and on the emergence of novelties, in a meta-theoretical and transdisciplinary way. A general theory of development in the field of complex systems still requires great conceptual efforts but seems to be a gateway to more sophisticated models of the child and the adult, and an opportunity for renewed inter-theoretical dialogues.

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Note

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The Wonder Years in the history of Developmental Psychology: The 1970s

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Fifty years ago, we witnessed the emergence of four milestones that changed the conceptual and methodological foundations of developmental psychology. The extraordinary thing is that these nuclei all took off in the 1970s, within a few years of each other, and that many developments continued until the 1990s, leaving an indelible mark on the present. It will be argued that they were not the only ones, and that the 1980s brought the cognitive revolution to psychology (Gardner, 1987), or the question of the structure of the mental (Fodor, 1983), both complex and deep problematics, although it must be admitted that their resonance was much more limited. One could even argue this decade opened the door for the precipitation of these and other problematics.

The geopolitics of 1970 were also shaken by political changes: the Watergate scandal, the aftermath of Mai 68, the Tlatelolco Square massacre, the end of the Vietnam War, and technological changes such as the ARPANET leading to the Internet, to name only a few. All this brought with it a reedition of values and an exercise of reflection on the principles of society. This environment contributed, perhaps, to animate a new dynamic that amplified the possibilities of conceptual changes for sciences and ideas, and the unpredictable began to overtake the horizon.

FROM ATTACHMENT THEORY TO THE SECURE BASE OF J. BOWLBY & M. AINSWORTH

Attachment is one of the milestones of the 1970s. The bond between infant and mother (or caregiver) is established trough interactions and considered to be irreplaceable. Chronologically, it emerges in J. Bowlby's 1969 text Attachment, Separation and Loss. Of psychoanalytic and clinical origin, Bowlby migrates towards a contextual conception where the clinical individual axis will give way to the relational axis, and the dyad replaces the subject by integrating the cultural. Both elements will change the course, methodologically and conceptually, in the approach to childhood (Ainsworth, 1978).

Research on attachment theory will confirm that this relational bond is universal (functionality). The cultural will manifest in behavioral aspects, therefore changing overtime. Both the quality of secure base relationships and the maternal sensitivity enable the individual's capacity to organize a system of attachment behaviors. To that extent, the subject will be prone to build secure relationships (Posada & Carbonell, 2004). The richness of the fluidity of exchanges will promote the construction of healthier relationships in the future (Ainsworth, Bell & Stayton, 1974).

This reliable bond is then pivotal to the concept of a secure family base and thus to the possibility of interventions to strengthen family relationships. Many studies confirm that the greater the physical contact and the better the verbal interaction, the higher the infants' security scores (Posada et al., 2004). In summary, research on attachment has achieved the most significant empirical evidence in confirmatory studies, and has been a fertile space for understanding and enriching the cultural forms in which it is constructed.

THE BABY BOOM OR THE CHALLENGE TO THE BABY OF TRADITIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

An unsuspectedly precocious baby also inaugurated the 1970s. He turned his head backwards when there was a sound stimulus (Wertheimer, 1971), as if he knew that sound had a visible materiality. Within a few hours he imitated gestures (haptic modality), which he saw (visual modality) on the caregiver's face, crossing information

between sensory modalities. He was also sensitive to the symmetry and organization of the face (Fantz, 1963) and discriminated vowels over consonants in language (Mehler & Dupoux, 1984). All these studies agreed that infants possessed at birth a more sophisticated perceptual and cognitive system than what psychology had traditionally recognized. This rediscovered representational system forced a change in the vision of the baby and would resoundingly transform the discipline itself (Puche-Navarro, 1990, 1991; Bower, 1990; Parke, 2004, Mehler & Dupoux, 1990).

THE SUBJECT OF THEORIES IN ACTION VERSUS THE SUBJECT OF STRUCTURES

The article Get a Theory and Go Ahead (Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1974) noy only meant a 180-degree change for Piagetian theory itself, but also for the whole discipline. The epistemic subject was abandoned to move towards a subject within a functional conception of development, a real subject with "theories in action". A subject capable of formulating hypotheses and register regularities as a result of his interactions with the environment, standing in contradiction to what was previously thought of him. Regularities such as gravitational properties: bodies fall when they do not have a support or are thrown up, which emerges at the end of the 1st year (Puche-Navarro, 1991). The ability to solve problems by reconstructing simple mechanisms in her 2nd year (Cerchiaro, 2014), and then around the ages of 3 and 4 that child will be capable of operating catapults, pulleys and other devices intimately linked to the history of humankind (Puche-Navarro, 2000). The extreme position of the child as scientist was the formula "scientists think like children" (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1998). Research on scientific reasoning emerged to reinvent the child.

Undoubtedly, the most important and suggestive aspect, which some of us believe has gone unnoticed in history, is that the works of Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder were the germ of what would later be called the study of algorithms. The recording of children's procedures makes it possible to monitor the operations of that child who reanalyzes this information repeatedly and thus arrives at a solution and understanding of the task. The work of these authors will allow the possibility of modeling the procedures and functioning of the cognitive activity based on the algorithm.

FROM ETHOLOGY TO PSYCHOLOGY…. OF THE MIND

Throughout that fantastic decade of the 1970s, another core that stirred developmental psychology was identified in ethological studies, specifically of chimpanzees (Premack & Premack, 1971). Did chimpanzees have a theory of mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978)? That question carried over into child psychology and helped establish a subdiscipline called Theory of Mind.

Adjacent themes had been raised in studies of social development, moral development, and interaction and metacognitive processes (Flavell 1974; 1976). However, it was not a fully recognized field with systematic questions and research, and with its own methodology that responded to these hypotheses. In that sense, the contributions of Premack and Woodruff (1978) opened a space for psychology to address these issues directly and definitively.

The mental loops characteristic when the child in her interrelationship with someone close is able to connect emotionally and ask herself "do you know that I know?", or "I know that you feel what I feel". Even more interesting is the inferential system premised with "I know that you know that I know" (Astington, 1993; 2001). These questions and a new device such as "false belief", revitalized research creating new directions (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), as well as the accumulation of studies on shared intentionality (Tomasello, 1999).

WHAT IS THE PANORAMA OF CONCEPTUAL & METHODOLOGICAL CHANGES

The first thing to remember is that the 1930s saw the consolidation of developmental psychology as a discipline, thanks to its methodological scaffolding (Parke, 2004; Thompson, 2016). And our hypothesis is that in the 1970s alone, in just 10 years, there would be a significant reorganization, a 2nd transformation that very elegantly (as mathematicians would say) would throw milestones that exhibited novel bodies in the methodological.

This is the case of the registers of information, as well as with the eyes of the observer, both with the attachment theories and with the impressive arsenal of research on babies. Similarly, the large set of open resolution situations produced an enormous collection of procedures that allowed mapping mental activity. The devices of false belief situations and other ways of approaching theory of mind brought completely novel structures compared to traditional cases. Undoubtedly, methodological changes were the scaffolding and developmental psychology shows itself as a mature and not only promising discipline.

But if the methodological aspect marked unprecedented advances, the conceptual changes were even more significant. Research revealed a baby who begins to know and becomes involved with his environment in an active, participatory way, with much more developed capacities than traditionally expected. Thus, cognition became an active part of the agenda, with cognitive development becoming a privileged area —all this required rethinking development and rethinking childhood, with all the imaginable

consequences.

Although tenuous and little explored, one can advance the hypothesis that the threads between these milestones weave relationships with each other. This precocious infant who recognizes the mother shows a sophisticated perceptual system and builds with her (or her caregiver) an ineffable bond, which assures her future.

This infant who begins to build intentionality could be related to the child who will later elaborate an inferential system where she can be more and more aware of her own knowledge and loops. Certainly those 10 years of 1970 changed the face of developmental psychology, which will gravitate towards childhood and cognitive psychology. Thanks to this, developmental psychology is today one of the most active, rigorous and significant disciplines of psychology, although the bibliography of our history has been elusive without delving into its richness and capacity.

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History of psychology: The garden of delicious ideas for innovation

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Writing on history of psychology in the 21st century seems deeply anachronistic. All over the World in psychology institutions we can observe step-by-step reduction of focus on history of psychology. Courses on history are increasingly eliminated, or transposed to be parts of substance courses. History becomes presented as if it is a depository of failed ideas and practices. This all happens at a time when the real history of psychology is being re-discovered (Klempe, 2020, Klempe and Smith, 2016, Valsiner, 2012). This contrast is surprising—while the story of cultural history of psychology is becoming complete, the relevance of that history is being made irrelevant.

Two social representations govern the organization of attitudes towards history of psychology. The destructive one entails the meta-level belief that historical processes operate as objective sieves that select out the unproductive ideas and practices, keeping in some others that are made "scientific" by social normativity. Thus the traditions of Ganzheitspsychologie and Gestaltpsychologie—both creative domains in Europe in the 1880s to 1930s—have vanished into the "dustbin of history". In contrast, the theoretically unsubstantiable practices of standardized test making of intelligence and personality thrive as if these were on the frontiers of science.

There is thus a case of vested interest on behalf of the power holders of the so far established (and often patented) knowledge to block uncontrollable innovation in the field. History of psychology is the hostage to this power ploy. At worst, it is eliminated from psychology curriculae in parallel to the proliferation of "manualized practices" that take over the area of applied psychology. At most—history of psychology becomes narrowed down to history of persons in psychology, or to the account of instruments once developed but by the age of cellular phones rendered obsolete.

The result —history of psychology becomes glorified as a museum of famous personages and once productive instruments— with careful distancing of the activities of psychologists today from the possible impacts of the museum objects on their work today.

Interestingly, the acts of glorification of the "giants on whose shoulders we stand" —the classic psychologists highly regarded in history of psychology such as Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget, Lev Vygotsky—work towards making their ideas into museum objects rather than bases for further development. The more we talk about "Vygotsky was a genius" the less we actually know of his actual efforts to build up new psychology (van der Veer & Valsiner, Jean Piaget's "stage theory" is endlessly re-told in psychology textbooks all over the World—and his actual theory of development (equilibration majorante) almost completely unknown. To become glorified equals to being forgotten.

All these examples amount to the prevailing social representation that guides psychology's relations to its own history. Yet there is an alternative social representation that could release psychology's history from the prison of its museum status. Ideas once advanced and not maintained—for whatever reasons—can be a treasure box for our new efforts in developing psychology. Bringing back the actual ideas from the forgotten writings (See Carlos Cornejo and Christian Hernandez Editors, to appear in 2023). Forgotten names Forgotten Names: Historical contributions from 19th Century. Cham, CH: Springer.) of the past authors can have an invigorating role for advancement of science. For example—return to the field theoretical efforts of Kurt Lewin, or to the unfinished theory of developmental logic of James Mark Baldwin and trying these out in new ways can remarkably revolutionize the field in our 21st century.

The return of historical ideas is not a new fashion for the old. To be productive it needs to involve generalization (Valsiner, 2019). Psychology cannot be an "empirical science" since being a science necessarily entails abstractive generalization. In psychology the prevailing focus on being applied and benefitting society may end up being a Trojan horse that leads to capture of productive ideas in the service of mundane tasks in society. Depth of historical knowledge is a way to protect the science from such profanation, and further growth of our discipline depends in careful selection of productive ideas from our own history, and their transformation into new theoretical solutions.

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Para Além da Psicofísica: Fechner e as visões diurna e noturna [Beyond Psychophysics: Fechner and the Day and Night Visions]



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Marcus Vinicius do Amaral Gama Santos

Gustav Fechner (1801-1887) is a thinker who plays a unique role in narratives in the history of psychology: in a large number of works he is described as a kind of scientific genius who would have opened the doors to the mathematization of psychological phenomena, but having also produced a large body of satirical, metaphysical and religious texts. In these historical narratives, these texts are often presented as metaphysical curiosities. (source Editora Nau).

In this book we present for the first time in Portuguese one of these texts, "The Little Book of Life After Death" – written by Fechner in the 1830s and accompanied here by the introduction written by William James for the English edition (1904) – , in addition to a set of articles by several foreign researchers, who join Brazilian researchers to give a unique dimension to the life and work of this unique German thinker. In the same gesture, we refuse the fragmentation operation carried out by historians of psychology and propose a resumption of Fechner's main questions, seeking a format for the academic text that does not exclude the aesthetic and the poetic. We take Fechner as authorship to be reconstructed by the voice of his texts, of his commentators around the world and in the expressions of the artistic work, allowing a perspective far beyond that outlined by the history of psychology manuals (source Editora Nau).

In choosing the texts presented here, in the interlocution with the commentators and with the works of literary and visual poetry that make up this edition, we believe we are moving away from what the author called "night vision", including all the reductionist and mechanistic perspectives regarding understanding our existence in the cosmos (source Editora Nau).

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